»We are not done with the state«: An Interview with Saskia Sassen by Christof Parnreiter. Held at the University of Chicago. by Parnreiter, Christof
»We are not done with the state« 
An Interview with Saskia Sassen by Christof Parnreiter. 
Held at the University of Chicago. 
A certain discourse on globalization 
maintains that places in general, and ci-
ties in particular, become less important 
with the emergence of new information 
technologies and economic globaliza-
tion. You argue, on the contrary, that 
place still is crucial. 
It is true that the ascendance of infor-
mation technologies and the associated 
increase in the mobility and liquidity of 
capital are key properties of the current 
phase. However, that does not make 
place unnecessary. To have hypermobi-
lity of capital, you need also capital fi-
xity and mixes of human talent. Mana-
ging and servicing the economy in a 
context of enormous complexity, of un-
certain markets and of changing condi-
tions for firms operating globally requi-
res an enormous mix of state of the art 
resources, infrastructure and talent. On-
ly cities can offer such an environment, 
only cities provide the conditions to 
execute these complex tasks. Likewise, 
only cities can offer the organizational 
complexity which is necessary for firms 
to maximize the benefits they can derive 
from the new information technologies. 
One of the specifics of today is that 
we see a re-scaling of the strategic terri-
tories which constitute the economic sy-
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stem. For a long time there have been 
cross-border economic processes - flows 
of capital, labor, goods, raw materials, 
tourists. But to a !arge extent these took 
place within the inter-state system, where 
the key articulators were nation states. 
This has changed rather dramatically 
over the last decade as a result of pri-
vatization, deregulation, the opening up 
of national economies to foreign firms, 
and the growing participation of natio-
nal economic actors in global markets. 
Yet, the partial unbundling or at least 
weakening of the nation as a spatial unit 
due to privatization and deregulation 
and the associated strengthening of glo-
balization does not mean a loss of signi-
ficance of places. Rather, it promotes 
conditions for the ascendance of a new 
type of organizational structure and of 
other spatial units or scales than the 
state. To capture this theoretically and 
empirically requires, correspondingly, a 
new type of conceptual architecture. 
Constructs such as the global city and 
the global-city region are, in my rea-
ding, important elements in this new 
conceptual architecture. 
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How do you characterize a global city? services they need to produce, the un-
There are seven hypotheses through 
which I organized the data and the theo-
rization of the global city model. First, 
the geographic dispersal of economic 
activities which marks globalization, 
along with the simultaneous integration 
of such geographically dispersed activi-
ties, is a key factor feeding the growth 
and importance of central corporate 
functions. The more dispersed a firm's 
operations across different countries 
the more complex and strategic its cen~ 
tral functions - that is, the work of ma-
naging, coordinating, servicing, finan-
cing a firm 's network of operations. 
Second, these central functions be-
come so complex that increasingly the 
headquarters of !arge global firms out-
source them: they buy a share of their 
central functions from highly speciali-
zed service firms: accounting, legal, pu-
blic relations, programming, telecom-
munications, and other such services. 
~hus whil~ even ten years ago the key 
s1te for the production of these central 
headquarter functions were the head-
quarters of a firm, today there is a se-
cond key site: the specialized service 
firms contracted by headquarters to 
produce some of these central functions 
or components of them. This is especi-
ally the case with firms involved in glo-
bal markets and non-routine operati-
ons. But increasingly the headquarters 
of all large firms are buying more of 
such inputs rather than producing them 
in-house. 
Third, those specialized service firms 
engaged in the most complex and globa-
lized markets are subjected to agglome-
ration economies. The complexity of the 
130 
certainty of the markets they are invol-
ved with either directly or through the 
headquarters for which they are produ-
cing the services, and the growing im-
portance of speed in all these transac-
tions, is a mix of conditions that consti-
tutes a new agglomeration dynamic. 
The mix of firms, talents and expertise 
from a broad range of specialized fields 
makes a certain type of urban environ-
ment function as an information center. 
Being in a city becomes synonymous 
with being in an extremely intense and 
dense information loop. Conversely, the 
sheer amount of information which is 
produced and processed today creates a 
need for a higher order type of informa-
tion, namely a joining of data and inter-
pretation. In this regard cities can also 
be thought of as important locations in 
strategic global information loops. This 
is a type of information loop which as 
of now still cannot be replicated fully in 
electronic space, and has as one of its 
added value features the fact of unfore-
seen and unplanned mixes of informa-
tion, expertise and talent, which can 
produce a higher order of information. 
This does not hold for routinized activi-
ties which are not yet subjected to un-
certainty and non-standardized forms of 
complexity. Global cities are, in this re-
gard, production sites for the leading in-
formation industries of our time. 
A fourth hypothesis, derived from the 
preceding one, is that the more head-
quarters outsource their most complex, 
unstandardized functions particularly 
those subject to uncertain and changing 
markets and to speed, the freer they are 
to opt for any location because the more 
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the work actually clone in the headquar-
ters is not subject to agglomeration eco-
nomies. This further underlines that the 
key sector specifying the distinctive pro-
duction advantages of global cities is the 
highly specialized and networked servi-
ces sector. In developing this hypothesis 
I was responding to a very common no-
tion that the number of headquarters is 
what specifies a global city. Empirically 
it may still be the case in many countries 
that the leading business center is also 
the leading concentration of headquar-
ters, but this may weil be because there 
is an absence of alternative locational 
options. But in countries with a weil de-
veloped infrastructure outside the lea-
ding business center, there are likely to 
be multiple locational options for such 
headquarters. 
Fifth, these specialized service firms 
need to provide a global service which 
means a global network of affiliates or 
some other form of partnership, and as 
a result we have seen a strengthening of 
cross-border city-to-city transactions 
and networks. At the limit this may weil 
be the beginning of a formation of trans-
national urban systems. The growth of 
global markets for finance and speciali-
zed services, the need for transnational 
servicing networks due to sharp increa-
ses in international investment, the re-
duced role of the government in the re-
gulation of international economic ac-
tivity and the corresponding ascendance 
of other institutional arenas, notably 
global markets and corporate headquar-
ters - all these point to the existence of a 
series of transnational networks of ci-
ties. One implication of this, and a rela-
ted hypothesis for research, is that the 
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economic fortunes of these cities be-
come increasingly disconnected from 
their broader hinterlands or even their 
national economies. In this we can per-
ceive the formation, at least incipient, of 
transnational urban systems. lt seems to 
me that to a !arge extent the major bu-
siness centers in the world today draw 
their importance from these transnatio-
nal networks. There is no such thing as 
a single global city - and in this sense 
there is a sharp contrast with the erst-
while capitals of empires. 
A sixth hypothesis is that the growing 
number of high level professionals and 
high-profit making specialized service 
firms has the effect of raising the degree 
of spatial and socio-economic inequality 
evident in these cities. The strategic role 
of these specialized services as inpurs 
raises the value of top level professio-
nals and their numbers. Further, talent 
can matter enormously for the quality 
of these strategic outputs, and given the 
importance of speed, proven talent is an 
added value, the structure of rewards is 
likely to experience rapid increases. Ty-
pes of activities and of workers lacking 
these attributes, whether in manufactu-
ring or industrial services, are likely to 
get caught in the opposite cycle. 
A seventh hypothesis is that one result 
of the dynamics described in hypothesis 
six is the growing informalization of a 
range of economic activities which find 
their effective demand in these cities yet 
have profit rates that do not allow them 
to compete for various resources with 
the high-profit making firms at the top 
of the system. Informalizing part or all 
production and distribution activities, 
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including services, is one way of survi-
ving under these conditions. 
Critics of the global city debate the que-
stion to which extend we can really 
speak of novel developments. Indeed, 
neither the term nor the concept of 
world cities is totally new. Goethe called 
Vienna a world city, and Patrick Geddes 
used the term in 1915 for cities where 
the most important economic transac-
tions were realized. The term was re-
launched in the work of Peter Hall in 
the 1960s and re-specified by ] ohn 
Friedmann in the 1980s. For Braudel a 
world city is a city of international im-
portance, a city that lies in the center of 
a world economy. He furthermore 
points out that world cities are nodes 
where the flows of information, mi-
grants, money, goods etc intersect. So 
what is the difference to today's global 
cities? 
Yes of course, in some ways Genoa and 
Venice were already global cities, and so 
was Braudel's »Superville«. Braudel, Ar-
righi and others already spelled out a 
number of the issues that we see recur-
ring today. Here Arrighi's analysis is of 
interest in that it posits the recurrence of 
certain organizational patterns in diffe-
rent phases of the capitalist world eco-
nomy, but at higher orders of comple-
xity and expanded scope, and timed to 
follow or precede particular configurati-
ons of the world economy. I don't disag-
ree with that. But my question then is: is 
that enough to say that it was already 
there? That forme as a researcher is not 
enough. The specifics of today need to 
be recognized and need to be studied. 
When I first chose to use the term » glo-
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bal city« in 1984 I did so knowingly - it 
was an attempt to name a difference: 
the specificity of the global as it gets 
structured in the contemporary period. I 
did not chose the obvious alternative, 
world city, because it had precisely the 
opposite attribute: it referred to a type 
of city which we have seen over centu-
ries, and most probably also in much 
earlier periods in Asia than in the West. 
The first particular feature of today is 
the question of the nation. Venice and 
Genoa were not dealing with a history 
of a hundred years in which the nation 
was marked as a Strategie scale for eco-
nomics and politics. While territory has 
historically been the subject to multiple 
systems of control, over the last century, 
territory, law, participation, culture, ad-
ministration etc. were constructed at the 
national scale. That makes a big diffe-
rence to earlier periods. To me it is cru-
cial that today the network of global ci-
ties emerges out of that context. That 
implies a whole series of necessary ne-
gotiations between the global and the 
nation which did not happen in that 
way in earlier times. One of the outeü-
mes of that negotiation is what I call in-
cipient denationalizing of strategic in-
stantiations of the nation state. Out of 
which also comes the legal infrastruc-
ture for globalization which is quite 
thick and formalized and institutionali-
zed. 
The second major marking condition 
of the current situation is the technolo-
gical issue, the specific features of the 
new technologies. They allow to increase 
the capacity to dematerialize and liquefy 
investment which means for instance 
that this expanding network of global 
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cities can target more and more coun-
tries in a very strategic fashion to suck 
out national wealth. The global city 
contains the resources - like material in-
frastructure or human talent - which 
make it possible to liquefy that national 
wealth and to inject it into this global 
city network. The kinds of instruments 
that have been invented, the kind of 
technical infrastructure in which those 
instruments can maximize the conse-
quences of that liquefaction make an 
enormous difference to what was the 
case in the past when so much of econo-
mic transaction was just not quite as li-
quid as it is today. This allows, for ex-
ample, for these superprofit making ca-
pacities. To say that there was finance 
capital then and there is finance capital 
today is just not enough because it is 
much more liquid now, much more in-
termediated. Finance is no longer the 
same as it was in the past. lt is no longer 
a simple service. lt is a service, it servi-
ces, but it also becomes something eise, 
we still use the same term, but it really is 
something eise. lt becomes it's own 
commodity. 
Thus, given what is distinctive about 
today - first the fact that we have just 
come out of these hundred years of rhe 
nation, and second the new technologies 
- it is quite possible that there are very, 
very specific differences in the current 
period. 
Do you think that a comparative histo-
rical study of world or global cities fo-
cussing on aspects such as cross-border 
connections, city networks, finance, glo-
bal control capacities etc. could be worth-
while? 
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lt could be interesting but you would 
need a very particular combination of 
scholarship to do it weil. I think we 
have two problems. One is that when 
people like me are going to look at the 
past we do that with our own concep-
tual grid that will pick up certain issues. 
That might produce a different story of 
Venice than Braudel has produced. And 
the other problem is that when experts 
of that period look at the present they 
also use their own conceptual grid and 
they will see certain things. In a Jot of 
comparative studies there is an enor-
mous risk of a built in bias. You might 
gain something, but you also loose so-
mething. Bur it would be interesting to 
put together experts and then really un-
pack what is different today compared 
to earlier periods. I can image for exam-
ple having to do with some version of 
empire and then the city emerging as 
partly at least disengaged from that con-
dition of empire, which would probably 
be similar to what I am calling incipient 
denationalizing or partial denationali-
zing which is today the mechanism 
which negotiates between the condition 
of the nation and the facility of a global 
city that is part of a national territory. 
So, it might be an interesting question, 
and I have the impression that it is get-
ting on the agenda because enough peo-
ple are interested in globalization and 
cities, enough people understand that 
there is some discontinuity. That does of 
course not mean that everything is new 
or that everything has changed. Bur it is 
such a common notion that nothing has 
really changed, that is all the same, so it 
might be actually a wonderful explora-
tion. However, it should be a very small 
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group of researchers, no performativity, 
it is not about winning or loosing a de-
bate. 
When Braudel speaks about world ci-
ties, he maintains that the world eco-
nomy allows only for one world city. 
That means that the rise of Genoa meant 
the decline of Antwerp, and the rise of 
Amsterdam meant the decline of Genoa, 
etc. Could it be a specific feature of to-
day's globalization that a cross border 
network of cities emerges where cities 
not only compete with each other but 
also conduct a certain division of labor? 
Exactly. The importance of cross-border 
networks connecting global cities is a 
major marking condition of the current 
period. Much of the older literature 
does not have the fact of globalization 
and the centrality of cross-border net-
works connecting cities as crucial varia-
bles. The earlier literature on world ci-
ties is closer to the notion of capitals of 
empires: one city at the top of the power 
hierarchy. In the current literature on 
global cities the determining factor is a 
cross-border, global network of cities 
that function as Strategie sites for global 
economic operations. There is no such 
entity as a single global city as there is 
with the capital of an empire. By defini-
tion, the global city is part of a network 
of cities. In this regard it could be said 
that most of today's major global cities 
are also world cities, but that there may 
weil be some global cities today that are 
not world cities in the full, rich sense of 
that term. Miami for example has deve-
loped global city functions beginning in 
the late 1980s, but that does not make it 
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a world city in that older sense of the 
term. 
In addition, the detailed examination 
of three particular cities - New York, 
London, Tokyo - in my 1991 book 
» The Global City« brought to the fore 
the extent to which these cities collabo-
rate through their very specific advanta-
ges rather than simply competing with 
each other. In focusing on global finance 
it became clear that the growth of the 
major centers was partly derived from 
the growing network of financial cen-
ters. In looking at the broader network 
it also became clear to what extent it 
was and remains characterized by a pro-
nounced hierarchy among this growing 
number of centers which constitute it. 
Yet, it is not only the network of finan-
cial centers. The growth of networked 
cross-border dynamics among global ci-
ties includes a broad range of domains -
political, cultural, social, criminal. 
There are cross-border transactions among 
immigrant communities and communi-
ties of origin and a greater intensity in 
the use of these networks once they be-
come established, including economic 
activities which were unlikely until now. 
We also see greater cross-border net-
works for cultural purposes, as in the 
growth of international markets for art 
and a transnational dass of curators; 
and for non-formal political purposes, 
as in the growth of transnational net-
works of activists around environ-
mental causes, human rights, and so on. 
These are largely city-to-city cross-bor-
der networks, or at least, it appears at 
this time to be simpler to capture the 
existence and modalities of these net-
works at the city level. The same can be 
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said for the new cross-border criminal 
networks. 
You stressed that the transformations 
which the nation and the nation state 
are undergoing mark a specific condi-
tion in the era of globalization. Would 
you agree that the nation state, which 
had the agency for the last hundred 
years, loses influence, while cities re-
emerge as agents - like once Genoa? 
Venice and Genoa I think so. But it is 
still different because the state is still the 
major dominant power. We are not 
clone with the state. Venice and Genoa 
did not have to cope with questions of 
the nation state. What confuses this is-
sue is that the state itself scales its stra-
tegic operations differently today than it 
did twenty years ago. The state itself de-
centered, relocated some of its functions 
to other domains. lt began to scale its 
strategic operations both on a subnatio-
nal and a supranational level, so that 
the state itself is not always functioning 
on the scale of the nation. lt is not that 
the state disappears, its not that sover-
eignty disappears, but state-ness, sover-
eignty etc., these conditions are trans-
formed. 
That means that the agency which 
New York has is still different from the 
agency Genoa had. lt was clearer, a 
simpler institutional landscape then. To-
day, the scale of the nation is still domi-
nant - institutionally, administratively, 
in terms of power, in terms of authority, 
in the sense of authorizing, making. The 
state is still the crucial agent, the enga-
gement by the state is necessary for glo-
balization. But what the state is doing is 
denationalizing, it is relocating what it 
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used to incorporate to these other do-
mains. The state itself has authored 
agency for certain economic actors, for 
certain capacities in the economy that 
tend to relocate and to concentrate in 
the space of the city. Genoa and Venice 
didn't have to deal with that. So, only if 
you withdraw to an enormous level of 
generality can you say: Genoa had agen-
cy and so had Venice, as today do New 
York and London. That is true, and at a 
certain level it is enormously exciting. 
But that is only the beginning. Then you 
need to dig, to excavate, and then, when 
your stuff becomes to get thick and 
complex and interesting, that's when 
you see the specificities of the current 
condition. The same argument l make 
in respect to the informal economy: Of 
course many of the informal activities 
today look like those activities looked a 
hundred and fifty years ago. But in bet-
ween is this incredible history of the re-
gulatory state, which regulated work-
places, regulated the employment relati-
onships etc. And that makes a big diffe-
rence. 
According to Braudel, »city« and »state« 
always have been rivals. Historically, 
strong states implied weak cities and 
vice versa. So the question arises if, we 
do not so much experience a new qua-
lity in state-city relations, but rather a 
phase in which the city got again the up-
per hand over the state? 
On some level most of the history might 
be characterized by what Braudel says, 
but not the last hundred years. I don't 
think that under Fordism there was ri-
valry between the city and the state. In 
that epoch the strategic sites for econo-
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mies and for politics are two: the fac-
tory and the government. The economic 
project was scaled at the national scale, 
and the city is truly a servicing function. 
Further, today's marking condition is 
not so much the city - state relation in 
general. lt is something different. This 
relation is throughout there, New York 
had a city/state relationship for a long 
time. What I am saying is that in the last 
hundred years or so the regulatory state 
was very accomplished in subjecting 
everything to national rule, constructing 
the legal and administrative instruments 
and all the institutional apparatus that 
made the nation absolutely preeminent. 
Now, on some very broad, general level 
one could say that the history of the na-
tion state is exceptional because terri-
tory has historically been subjected to 
multiple systems of control. But the ex-
ception that stands out is that hundred 
years of history of the nation. In this pe-
riod the nation state constructs its 
exclusive authority and exclusive rule 
over territory, over law, administration, 
participation and citizenship etc. 
Out of that comes the unpacking and 
unbundling that we face today that ma-
kes it possible for rhe cities to gain 
ascendance. That is a little more specific 
than just city versus state. Although of 
course you might say that what emerges 
now is another form of that city-state 
relation. But it is not the level I am inte-
rested in. I am interested in underpin-
ning how out of this dynamic, which 
scaled at the national level, where the 
intention was to construct the nation as 
preeminent, comes this other dynamic, 
where strategic operations are scaled on 
different levels. Among these are the 
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sub-national, notably cities and regions, 
cross-border regions encompassing two 
or more sub-national entities, and su-
pra-national entities, i.e. global digitali-
zed markets and free trade blocs. The 
dynamics and processes that get territo-
rialized at these diverse scales can in 
principle be regional, national or global. 
In the case of global cities, the dynamics 
and processes that get territorialized are 
global. 
One of your main arguments is that 
what specifies a global city is that it is a 
place where global control capability is 
produced. 
Power needs to be produced and repro-
duced, it needs to be formalized, it 
needs to be institutionalized, given a 
form etc. That is why I don't like to say: 
the global city looks like Braudel's Su-
perville. You can't take these categories 
as given, neither the city nor the state. I 
want to understand the production of 
this. In much of the dominant discourse 
on globalization, technology and cities 
the end of cities as important economic 
units or scales is posited. In this respect 
I perceive a tendency to take the exi-
stence of a global economic system as a 
given, a function of the power of trans-
national corporations and global com-
munications. My counter argument is 
that the capabilities for global opera-
tion, coordination and control contai-
ned in the new information technologies 
and in the power of transnational cor-
porations need tobe produced. By focu-
sing on the production of these capabili-
ties we add a neglected dimension to the 
familiar issue of the power of !arge cor-
porations and the capacity of the new 
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technologies to neutralize distance and 
place. The focus shifts the emphasis 
from the production of these capabili-
ties to the practices that constitute what 
we call economic globalization and glo-
bal control. 
A focus on practices draws the cate-
gories of place and work process into 
the analysis of economic globalization. 
These are two categories easily overloo-
ked in accounts centered on the hyper-
mobility of capital and the power of 
transnational corporations. Developing 
categories such as place and work pro-
cess does not negate the centrality of hy-
permobility and power. Rather, it brings 
to the fore the fact that many of the re-
sources necessary for global economic 
activities are not hypermobile and are, 
indeed, deeply embedded in place, nota-
bly places such as global cities, global-
city regions, and export processing zo-
nes. 
This entails a whole infrastructure of 
activities, firms and jobs, which is ne-
cessary to run an advanced corporate 
economy. These industries are typically 
conceptualized in terms of hypermobi-
lity of their outputs and the high levels 
of expertise of their professionals rather 
than in terms of the production or work 
process involved and the requisite infra-
structure of facilities and non-expert 
jobs that are also part of these indu-
stries. This brings with it an emphasis 
on economic and spatial polarization 
because of the disproportionate concen-
tration of very high and very low in-
come jobs in the city compared with 
what would be the case at a !arger scale 
such as the region or the country. A fo-
cus on regions, in contrast will lead to 
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an emphasis on broad urbanization pat-
terns, a more encompassing economic 
base, more middle sectors of both house-
holds and firms. Emphasizing place, in-
frastructure and non-expert jobs mat-
ters precisely because so much of the fo-
cus has been on the neutralization of 
geography and place made possible by 
the new technologies. 
Recapturing the geography of places 
involved in globalization allows us to 
recapture people, workers, communi-
ties, and more specifically, the many dif-
ferent work cultures, besides the corpo-
rate culture, involved in the work of 
globalization. lt also brings with it an 
enormous research agenda, one that 
goes beyond the by now familiar focus 
on cross-border flows of goods, capital 
and information. Further, by emphasi-
zing the fact that global processes are at 
least partly embedded in national terri-
tories, such a focus introduces new va-
riables into current conceptions about 
economic globalization and the shrin-
king regulatory role of the state. That is 
to say, the space economy for major 
new transnational economic processes 
diverges in significant ways from the 
duality global/ national presupposed in 
much of the analysis on the global eco-
nomy. The duality national versus glo-
bal suggests two mutually exclusive spa-
ces - where one begins the other ends. 
One of the outcomes of a global city 
analysis is that it makes evident that the 
global materializes by necessity in speci-
fic places and institutional arrange-
ments, a good number of which, if not 
most, are located in national territories . 
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